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Introduction
Since the beginning of the 19th century, the Barents Sea area, as a sub-region
of the entire Arctic, has been considered one of the most peaceful regions in
the world. However, historically, there was high tension between the countries
of the northernmost parts of Europe – Finland, Norway, Sweden and
Russia – and the relationships between these counties have been characterised
by their struggle for sovereignty and security.1
Despite historical tensions and conﬂicts, in 1993, Finland, Norway, Russia
and Sweden established the so-called Barents Euro-Arctic Region – covering
the northernmost counties of Finland, Norway and Sweden, and the North-
western regions of the Russian Federation – based on common interests, and
the desire to strengthen shared identities across national borders (e.g., Heininen
2009). With the Barents cooperation in place, interregional cooperation
between the northern parts of the Nordic countries and Russia drastically
improved over the years and allowed for the creation of a governance frame-
work to improve the human security of its inhabitants. As mentioned by
Former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs, Bjorn Thore Godal,
throughout most of history … a regional identity emerged, a sense of
common destiny among peoples sharing the experience of trying to make
a living in harsh surroundings.
(Godal 1996)
In practice, this has contributed to foster peace and stability in the region and
laid the ground for the creation of a political region. Today, despite growing
tension between Russia and the West, speciﬁcally the USA and European
Union, and the consequent decrease in activities of Arctic cooperation since
2014 as a consequence of the crisis in Ukraine, cooperation in the Barents
Region still stands strong in promoting the wellbeing of the inhabitants of the
region.
Against this background, it is the aim of this chapter to describe and analyse
inter-regional cooperation in the European Arctic. More speciﬁcally, the
objective of this chapter is to provide a contextual background describing the
major characteristics that led to the establishment of the Barents cooperation.
While the assessment of this development for improving human security in
the region is mostly left to the following chapters, the last section concludes
with some remarks about the speciﬁc identity of the Barents Region as a
special ‘community’ within the Arctic Region, as well as the importance of
the interregional cooperation to strengthen human security in the region.
1 Geography and demography of the Barents Region
The Barents Region covers an area of 1.75 million square kilometres (about
three times the size of France), which extends from Lofoten in Norway in the
west to the Russian coal-mining town of Vorkuta in the east, and from Lake
Ladoga in the Russian Karelia in the south to Nordkapp in the North.2
The Barents Region includes lands and territories situated in the northernmost
parts of the continental Europe on the southern coast of the Barents Sea, and
consists of the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland, and the
northwestern regions of the Russian Federation. The Barents Sea, named
after a Dutch explorer, Willem Barentsz who undertook three Arctic expedi-
tions searching for the North West Passage in the sixteenth century, does not,
however, include the oﬃcial Barents Region. As a political region, the Barents
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area comprises the land along the coast of the Barents Sea but does not
include cooperation over the sea. This is mostly due to unsettled sovereignty
issues between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea (Carrillo 1998, 21).
From a geographic perspective, the Barents Region constitutes parts of the
Arctic and sub-Arctic regions which share a number of physical features. The
Kirkenes Declaration (1993) which created the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
notes that these include a ‘harsh climate, sparse population and vast territory’.3
To this could be added physical features such as large swathes of Arctic
tundra, polar night and midnight sun and areas of permafrost. There are
however, a number of diﬀerences, particularly between the Nordic countries
and Russia, such as living standards, language, culture, religion, history and
political traditions (Zimmerbauer 2012, 94). The Barents Region is located at
the intersection between eastern and western culture, between Catholic and
Orthodox Christianity (nowadays Lutheran and Orthodox), and conse-
quently, the population also shares diﬀerent languages, cultural and religious
traditions. Furthermore, it is a region that is culturally diverse with diﬀerent
livelihood systems.
The Barents Region is a home to 5.23 million people, the Finns, Norwegians,
Russians, Swedes and a number of indigenous people groups. Among the
inhabitants of the region, the Sami, the Nenets and the Veps account for the
indigenous peoples living in the region.4 These peoples have much maintained
their traditional way of life with diﬀerent usage of local resources, which were
established before nation-states were formed. The most populous of them, the
Sami people, are comprised of approximately 70 000–90 000 people living
across Finland, Norway, Sweden and the Kola Peninsula, Russia. The Sami
communities remain closely attached to their traditional livelihoods including
ﬁshing, hunting, reindeer herding and berry picking. It is estimated that
10 per cent of the Sami population is still involved in herding-grazing activities
on a fulltime basis. Indeed, their cultural, economic and political development
remains a core issue in the region, and for this reason, the protection of the
lands and resources of the traditional Sami territory – Sapmi – across the
northern borders of the four states of Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia
are of utmost importance. In all three Nordic countries, the Sami people have
their own assemblies to represent their interest at the state level and in Russia
they are recognised as indigenous peoples. Despite state borders, the Sami
people have maintained a common history, culture, language and traditions,
and their relations have increased since the end of the Cold War through the
development of political and cultural cooperation.
In addition, the Veps, who live in the southern part of the Republic of Karelia
and in remote parts of the Leningrad and Vologda Oblasts, form another indi-
genous minority of approximately 8200 people according to the 2002 census
(barentsinfo.org, 2017). While agriculture was always at the heart of their liveli-
hoods, most of the traditional occupations of the Veps have today vanished
(Kolga 2001). Finally, the Nenets are the most numerous indigenous people in
the Russian Federation. In the Barents Region they form a minority of about
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41 000 people living in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Arkhangelsk Oblast,
Komi Republic and Murmansk Oblast. Today, the majority of the Nenets live in
rural communities and are engaged in agricultural sector, in education and
health care. In addition, 14 per cent of the Nenets work in reindeer herding,
which are still migrating while other have settled in villages. On the whole, the
rural population of the Nenets has to count on local renewable resources to ful-
ﬁll their needs, though it is said that ‘the local economic situation has improved
thanks to high revenues from oil and gas development’ (Tuisku 2004).
In this context, national integration accompanied by modernisation and
industrialisation processes have raised tensions and conﬂicts of interests
between peoples and their livelihoods at regional and local levels. While parts
of indigenous peoples groups often follow a traditional lifestyle, engaging in
activities such as reindeer husbandry and subsistence ﬁshing, there is also a
highly skilled workforce in the region, which exploits the rich forestry, mineral,
oil, gas, ﬁshing and even diamond resources.5 It is signiﬁcant that not many
other parts of Europe have access to the amount of forests, ﬁsh, oil and gas
and other minerals present in the region. This has raised both growing con-
cerns regarding the environment, and has sparked important economic and
business interests in the region. Large mining sites have been exploited for
decades in the Barents Region. Recently, the region has also received interest
due to the discovery of several important natural gas and oil deposits in the
Barents Sea and Petsoran Sea.
All in all, the Barents Region is extremely rich in minerals and while extractive
industries cause controversy through their impact on the environment and
livelihoods of local communities, they are important for the development of
the region. Finally, renewable resources are also important, as Nordic counties
of the Barents Region have large hydropower resources and are currently
investing in massive wind power energy projects to meet the demand for
sustainable energy production and consumption.6
All these elements constitute the foundations for economic, social and cultural
development in the Barents Region and the markers for its speciﬁc identity.
2 The history of the Barents Region7
The history of the European Arctic, today the Barents Region, is that of
colonisation, state expansion and cooperation. Until the 13th century the states’
inﬂuence was small, and the region ‘was uncharted territory totally without
borders, taxation, conscription and other traits of nation states’ (Gyllenhaal
2017). Between the 13th and 20th centuries, the region was subject to many
geopolitical changes, mostly caused by hegemonic power struggles between
diﬀerent sovereigns. Only indigenous peoples, mostly nomadic, and small
groups of hunters and ﬁshermen from the Nordic countries and Novgorod
lived within the region. Most of these groups adapted to the environmental
conditions, possessed diﬀerent cultures and interacted to some extent with
each other. The absence of any homogenous population, still today, raises
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some diﬃculty for addressing the history of the Barents Region. Yet, the
impact of the colonisation process, the conﬂicts between nation-states and the
establishment of cooperation across state borders have forged a unique his-
torical relationship for the inhabitants of the region, which have helped to
shape the contours of a distinct society.
The colonisation of the Arctic region approximately began when non-
indigenous populations moved in the region and accentuated trade and cultural
relations with local communities. During the 14th century, the local popula-
tion also became the target of royal taxation and the inﬂuence of the church
increased. The colonisation process led to the establishment of competing
areas of authorities between local settlements and the kingdoms of Sweden,
Norway and Novgorod.8 For indigenous communities, the colonisation of the
Arctic also meant their connection to national political structures, including
rules of taxation, laws and control over local resources. The colonisation
process triggered important changes in the governance of the region, accom-
panied by major societal transformations fuelled by trade, industrial and
cultural developments. Historically, this process accelerated in the more
accessible Barents Region during the 16th century while, by comparison, the
Canadian Arctic remained relatively isolated until the mid-1900s.
With a focus on territorial control as a key element to strengthen sover-
eignty, the expansion of nation-states also spurred conﬂict in the region.
Between the 13th and 20th centuries, the countries that today consist of
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia were involved in various struggles for
supremacy in the governance of the population, land and resources of the
region. From 1397 until 1523 all the Nordic countries and nations were
governed under one kingdom, the Kalmar Union. During part of this
period, Sweden was a European great power. From 1523–1814 Nordic
governance consisted of two main states. Denmark ruled Norway, Iceland,
Greenland and the Faroe Islands, and Sweden ruled Finland from the 12th
century until Russia ﬁnally won control in 1809. In 1814, Norway became
part of a union with Sweden, lasting until 1905 when Norway gained inde-
pendence. In 1917, the October Revolution created Soviet Russia. In the
same year, Finland was able to use the chaos caused by the First World War
and the Bolshevik revolution to declare its full independence. The Second
World War, with human catastrophes and losses of inhabitants, meant
extensive geopolitical changes in the Barents Region. Despite two wars,
Finland remained independent but was partly destroyed and lost large
territories to Russia, such as the Petsamo region, which was only regained in
1920. Norway managed to keep its independence as well, even though Nazi
Germany occupied the whole country and used it, as well as Petsamo, as a
convenient launching point for the failed attack on the Russian city of
Murmansk. The Soviet Union was the main target of Nazi Germany in the
European Arctic. Supported by the Allies and their material assistance, such
as maritime escorts to Murmansk, the Soviet Union survived the siege,
though with important casualties.
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During the Second World War, the northernmost areas of Europe became a
place of great geopolitical signiﬁcance, especially as the German troops
occupied Norway and Svalbard, and were in charge of the Northern Front of
Finland (comprising half of the Finnish territory). With the Finnish-Russian
peace treaty ceding the Petsamo border region to Russia, Norway found itself
beside a closed border with the Soviet Union and with a large military pre-
sence next door. After the Second World War, the Kola Peninsula was indus-
trialised and militarised, transformed into a platform for industrial and
military activities with a stockpile of both conventional and nuclear weapons
as an important part of the military competition between the USSR and the
USA. As a consequence, traditional interaction in the northern areas became
even more diﬃcult, especially considering that there was almost no access
across the border from Finland or Norway into or out of the Soviet Union
from the late 1940s until the fall of the Soviet Union. This situation conse-
quently underlined an East–West divide that was practically impossible to
overcome until the end of the Cold War.
At the same time, Nordic states began to increase trans-border cooperation
to strengthen the integration and development of their northern areas. In
1952, the Nordic Council was established. This inter-parliamentary institution
has been instrumental in facilitating contact between peoples and developing
a sense of aﬃnity between them.9 The Nordic Council’s ﬁrst real contribution
was the establishment of a common labour market and a free visa zone for
citizens. In order to further cooperation between Nordic states, the inter-
governmental forum of the Nordic Council of Ministers was also established
in 1971 to complement the activities of the Nordic Council. In 1967, the
northernmost counties of Finland, Norway and Sweden also established the
North Calotte Committee as a forum for Nordic cooperation in the North
Calotte, to further cross boundary exchanges and cooperation in the ﬁeld of
regional policies, local economic development, culture and art.
Following stronger cooperation between Norway, Finland and Sweden,
their collective relations with the Soviet Union also evolved. Although ten-
sions between the two blocs remained, possible modes to integrate the Soviet
border regions within the inter-regional cooperation of the North Calotte
region were discussed. Starting in 1964, cultural meetings such as the North
Calotte Peace Days were organised under the auspices of peace and friend-
ship, and to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. Various forms of
cultural co-operation and the increase of individual contacts also accom-
panied such meetings across the Iron Curtain (Elenius et al. 2015, 341–343;
also Heininen 1999a, 1999b, 107–198).
3 The forerunners of the Barents cooperation: peace and
environmental collaboration
In 1985, perestroika opened a new window of opportunity to facilitate coop-
eration across the East–West border. In October 1987, the Soviet leader
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Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech in Murmansk and proclaimed the Arctic a
zone of peace. This event was fundamental to the transformation of the
region, constituting the beginning of a new phase in the history of its population.
As a result of these new opportunities, the organisation of international peace
and environmental events, many of which were Nordic-Russian, took place in
the summer of 1988 in Murmansk. Thus, in spite of the Cold War cleavage,
and due to the rich tradition of regional cooperation such as the Pomor
Trade, ‘it was during this period that the seeds of the future Barents were
sown’ (Elenius et al. 2015, 365) and that cooperation in this sub-arctic region
begun its journey.
In his speech, Mikhail Gorbachev (Pravda 1987) made concrete initiatives
outlining a goal to establish a nuclear-free zone and ‘zone of peace’ in the
(European) Arctic. Among the initiatives were measures that included a
restriction of naval and air force activities in the Baltic, Northern, Norwegian
and Greenland Seas and the promotion of conﬁdence-building measures
in those areas, cooperation on resource development, the organisation of an
international conference on Arctic scientiﬁc research coordination, and
cooperation in environmental protection.
The Murmansk speech was followed by immediate negative and positive
reactions as well as a series of diplomatic discussions and negotiations to
ensure peace and stability in the region and to increase functional coopera-
tion. Due to long-range and regional pollution, in particular radioactivity,
concern for the environment resurged in the 1980s as the subject of a number
of diﬀerent threats in the Barents Region, as well as the entire Arctic (e.g.,
Heininen and Lomagin 2017). Mostly emanating from the Russian side of the
Barents Sea, nuclear safety and air pollution became a signiﬁcant concern
and threat, particularly to Norway.10 As a result, the environment became a
new security issue in the region and the main target of a new international
cooperative framework, negotiation for the adoption of the Arctic Environ-
mental Protection Strategy (AEPS), began in 1989. It culminated in 1991 with
the adoption in Rovaniemi of a common document signed by the govern-
ments of the eight Arctic states and Arctic indigenous peoples’ organisations.
This non-binding agreement was the ﬁrst major political achievement after
the Cold War and marked the introduction of an Arctic dimension into
Northern European politics.
Building on the AEPS and need to enhance collaboration at the regional
level, new governance structures were also created to support this cooperation
including the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) established in 1993 and
the Arctic Council established in 1996. The ﬁrst step towards the creation of
the Arctic Council occurred in the late 1980s and was accelerated in 1991
after the AEPS was signed. After several years of meeting, the 1996 Ottawa
Declaration formally established the Arctic Council as an inter-governmental
forum for promoting cooperation among the Arctic States – Canada, the
United States, Russia, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, Norway and Finland –
with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities, but excluding
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representations of other Arctic inhabitants and sub-national governments.
The mandate of the Arctic Council focuses essentially on increasing coopera-
tion in the domain of environmental protection and sustainable development,
leaving military issues aside as too sensitive issues.
The creation of these new regional structures set the stage for deﬁning the
Arctic region and the Barents Region as distinctive, international political
regions (Young 1996; Käkönen 1996; Artic Council 2004; Griﬃths 1988;
Heininen 2009). This was also meant to stabilise the post-Cold War Arctic
and institutionalise interstate relations in the Arctic region, as well as develop
a new governance framework for reinforcing functional cooperation among
Arctic countries, regions and sub-regions.
4 The institutionalisation of the Barents Region’s cooperation
In December 1991, the Soviet Union ﬁnally collapsed, and the international
geopolitical landscape changed. With it came the opportunity for the Nordic
countries to reassess their foreign policies to work with, rather than against,
Russia with the ultimate aim of decreasing military tension from the Cold
War period and increasing political stability in the European North, as well as
the entire Arctic Region (e.g. Heininen 2009). The Norwegian Foreign Minister,
Thorvald Stoltenberg, ﬁrst proposed the concept of regional cooperation to
his Russian counterpart, Andrei Kozyrev as early as March 1992, a mere
three months after the Soviet Union was formally dissolved (Stokke and
Tunander 1994, 1). His proposal was based on the experience of the Baltic
Sea cooperation and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS). In April 1992,
the governors of the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk provinces in Russia were
invited to a meeting in Tromsø to discuss possible cooperation. In January
1993, a joint conference of the Foreign Ministers of Norway, Sweden, Fin-
land and Russia took place in Kirkenes just beside the Norwegian-Russian
border. It was at this ministerial meeting that the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region, as well as intergovernmental and interregional cooperation on the
region, was formally established.11
The Kirkenes Declaration was signed in January 1993 in Kirkenes, and set
out the objectives and purposes of the cooperation. It listed ‘environmental
protection’ in line with the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and
‘sustainable development’ in line with the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development, as the main objectives of the collaboration. Further, while
participants of the cooperation indicated ‘that the environmental dimension
must be fully integrated into all activities in the Region’, other areas of
cooperation are also listed in the document, such as economic cooperation,
science and technology, regional infrastructure, tourism, education and cultural
exchange.
In relation to economic cooperation, the Kirkenes Declaration also makes
clear that the environment should be preserved and that ‘the principles of envir-
onmental soundness and sustainability in all ﬁelds of economic co-operation’
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should be observed. Finally, the cooperation speciﬁcally targets the situation
of indigenous peoples, notably in support of the restoration and preservation
of Nenets and Sami cultures, and stresses that ‘wider human contacts and
increased cultural co-operation in the Region should be encouraged to pro-
mote constructive co-operation and good neighbourly relations’. Overall,
cross-border relations, with an aim to increase mutual conﬁdence, are at the
centre of the cooperation.
From a functional perspective, the Barents cooperation operates at diﬀerent
levels, on a dual level structure, which involves both national and regional
governments.
Firstly, at the national level, there is the Barents Euro-Arctic Council
(BEAC), an intergovernmental forum with the purpose ‘to serve as a forum
for cooperation among the participants’.12 The BEAC is made up of the
Foreign Ministers of member countries, Denmark Finland, Iceland, Norway,
Russia, Sweden and the European Union’s Commission. There are also nine
countries with observer status: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.13
The chairmanship of the Council rotates between Finland, Norway, Russia and
Sweden with each country holding the chair for two years at a time.14 For
example, for the period 2015–2017 the chairmanship was being held by
Russia, and for 2017–2019 it is being held by Sweden.15 Initially the BEAC
met annually, but in recent years, it meets biennially. Between meetings, the
Committee of Senior Oﬃcials deals with administrative matters. This committee
is made up of civil servants from the member states and from the European
Commission, and meets regularly to consider progress and to establish working
groups on various topics relevant to the cooperation.16
Second, at the regional level, there is the Barents Regional Council (BRC)
as a parallel body for interregional cooperation. While the BRC initially
included seven member regions, today it comprises 14 member counties and a
representative of the indigenous peoples in the northernmost parts of Finland,
Norway and Sweden and northwest Russia.17 The most recent member to
join was the Finnish county of North Karelia, which was approved as a
member in November 2016, having held observer status for many years.
There are also two organisations with observer status: The Council of Christian
Churches in the Barents Region and The Parliamentary Association of North
West Russia.18 With the same purposes as the BEAC, the BRC has a mandate
to support and promote cooperation and development in the Barents Region.
The purpose of the BRC is also to recognise and share local knowledge and
to provide the opportunity to identify and work on cooperative projects. The
chairmanship of the Regional Council rotates between the countries in
Norway, Sweden, Russia and Finland every two years with the provision that
the same country cannot chair both the interregional council and the inter-
national council at the same time.19 The executive body of the BRC is the
Barents Regional Committee, which is composed of civil servants from the
member counties.
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Furthermore, 15 working groups have been established to enhance coop-
eration on issues relevant to the Barents Region. Each working group is able
to enhance cooperation in its area of expertise and coordinates projects across
the Barents Region. Some of the working groups, such as the Working Group
on Environment and the Joint Committee on Rescue Cooperation, are working
groups established by the BEAC. Correspondingly, the BRC has established
others, such as the Regional Committee on Environment and the Regional
Working Group on Transport and Logistics. There are also a number of joint
working groups, including the Joint Working Group on Energy and the Joint
Working Group on Youth.
As part of these, the Working Group of Indigenous Peoples (WGIP)
established in 1995 on a permanent basis. It is composed of representatives of
the Sami, the Nenets and the Veps of the Barents Region. On a daily basis, the
main goal of the WGIP is ‘to secure indigenous peoples’ rights, foundation for
trade, society, culture and language through implementation of the Action
Plan of Indigenous Peoples’ (WGIP 2017, 7), which constitutes WGIP’s
policy development framework.20 The 2017 Action Plan lists diﬀerent issues
and a set of measures to implement in order to secure indigenous peoples’
rights.21 With this action plan, the WGIP sets the priorities of indigenous
peoples in the region and can advise the BEAC or the BRC when they initiate
projects concerning them. Unlike other regional working groups, in addition
to its operational role, the WGIP has also an advisory role to both the BEAC
and the BRC, which consequently gives it a political dimension. The chair of
the WGIP sits also as a member of the Committee of Senior Oﬃcials in the
BEAC and the Barents Regional Committee, which gives the WGIP a per-
manent right to attend all meetings organised by the councils. Thus, WGIP
constitutes an important platform for indigenous organisations to strengthen
their political stance at the regional level, as well as to enhance their coop-
eration with the national, regional and local authorities of the Barents
Region’s countries and counties (WGIP 2017, 7).
5 The development of the Barents cooperation, its achievements
and challenges
Those who established the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and signed the 1993
Kirkenes Declaration hoped that cooperation would lead to stability, pro-
gress, peace and security throughout the region and eventually promote the
wellbeing of the entire population. To celebrate its twentieth anniversary, the
Barents countries adopted a new declaration at the Barents Summit in 2013.
In the document (Kirkenes Declaration 2013) all states reaﬃrmed their com-
mitments to the cooperation, which is justiﬁed by ‘the important role the
Barents cooperation has played in strengthening mutual trust, stability and
security in Europe, by joint eﬀorts in northern Europe based on the shared
commitment to indivisible and comprehensive security’. Twenty years after its
establishment, these renewed statements certainly demonstrate that the
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cooperation is still playing an important role in the enhancement of security
and cooperation in the region. In fact, as an outcome of this development,
the Barents Region is also no longer a periphery of Europe, as it was before
1993, and ‘the demand for cooperation is greater today than ever’ (Kirkenes
Declaration 2013).
During these 20 years the geopolitical situation of the Barents Region, as
well as the entire Arctic, has signiﬁcantly changed from confrontation during the
Cold War period, when the Barents Sea area was mostly a military ‘theater’, to
an international, much more functional, cooperation (see Heininen and
Lomagin 2017, 269–274). In the 2010s there are two main developments or
tendencies. On the one hand, the Arctic region, with high geopolitical stability,
is globalised and impacted by grand environmental challenges, in particular
(rapid) climate change, and interests and plans for mass-scale exploitation of
natural resources located in the region. On the other hand, there is geopo-
litical tension between Russia and the West (in particular the USA and the
EU) much due to the Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Ukrainian
crisis/war.
However, despite this tension and colder political climate between the
Arctic states, the Barents Region’s oﬃcial and unoﬃcial cooperation remains
largely unaﬀected. Behind this lies Arctic ‘exceptionalism’, as high geopolitical
stability in the Arctic remains and is resilient (see Heininen 2016). In fact, it
has been suggested that ‘the Arctic to this point remained largely insulated
from wider geopolitical issues following 2014 – and in some cases cooperation
has deepened’ (Cliﬀord 2017) and contacts between regional and local repre-
sentatives still goes on (Nilsen 2016a). Compared to the Baltic Sea Region, it
was also stressed that in the Barents Region, ‘it is not as high tension’ and
that there is ‘good cooperation with Russia on a lot of common areas and issues
of importance’ (Nilsen 2016b). As a result, the Barents regional cooperation
stands strong (at the moment), and even in this diﬃcult geopolitical context,
it continues to promote the development of the region across national borders.
Regarding its achievement, over the last twenty years, the cooperation in
the Barents Region has led to the sharing of expertise, technology, ﬁnances
and other resources which has resulted in a number of improvements to
the environment for the beneﬁt of the whole of the region and, as a result, to the
security of the people in the region. Although the environmental threats have
not yet been completely eradicated (see Chapter 2.1), thanks to the cooperation
the threat of major environmental disasters, with all the implications for the
environment and for human security, has been dramatically reduced. There
have also been a number of cultural, educational and other projects with an
aim to bring the people(s) of the Barents Region together, some organised by
the formal institutions of the Barents Region, others merely as a result of
increased community cooperation. These include exhibitions and festivals,
such as the Barents Spektakel 2016, an impressive display of art, ﬁlm, work-
shops, seminars, music and sport in the nearby towns of Kirkenes (Norway)
and Nikel (Russia); and the Calotte Academy, an annual academic gathering
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and travelling symposium for scientiﬁc work and open discussion to implement
the interplay between science and politics (e.g. Final Report of the 2016 Calotte
Academy, Huotari et al. 2016). Other projects include student exchanges, a
multi-stage ski race dubbed the ‘Tour de Barents’ and a health programme
specialising in tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS (e.g. Wilson Rowe 2009, 35–52).
In 2016, the Ministers of Culture of the member states announced funding for
a number of scholarships across the region to foster cultural cooperation.
However, there are, also weaknesses, uncertainties and criticism regarding
the Barents cooperation. These notably relate to the fact that cooperation is
neither deep enough nor is there a common historical-cultural identity. As
Zimmerbaur (2012) argues ‘the idea of [the] region as an imagined community
is stronger elsewhere than in situ’. It can also be questioned how much activities
and tasks are currently performed under the auspices of each working groups.
The development of new projects to further cooperation is highly dependent
on resources and national support, which are manifestly insuﬃcient to support
cooperation. Currently, ‘the majority of Barents Region consider the current
level of ﬁnancing insuﬃcient for their joint activities’ and to ﬁnance every day
work (BEAC 2015, 7). The main issue in ﬁnancing the Barents cooperation
relates to a ‘lack of ﬁnancial mechanisms that would encompass the whole
Barents Region’. This situation ‘prevents regional actors from developing
geographically-wide projects and leads to unequal access to ﬁnancial oppor-
tunities of diﬀerent regions’ (BEAC 2015, 43). In addition, non-governmental
organisations and other civil society actors have also indicated that ﬁnancial
support remains insuﬃcient in supporting small-scale activities (BEAC 2015,
51). Thus, it seems that cooperation could be improved if more funding was
made available.
Furthermore, while the working groups and programme developed under
the auspices of the Barents cooperation have obtained tangible results in
reinforcing cross borders ties and relations, there are still issues that continue
to challenge the wellbeing of the Barents population that have not been
addressed institutionally. As already mentioned, this includes the grand scale
of environmental challenges, in particular the impact of global warming and
the development of natural resources located in the region. In addition,
whereas the Ukrainian crisis has not aﬀected the Barents cooperation directly,
it has strained the economic development of the region and increased political
tensions between states, a topic that is largely outside the purview of the
Barents cooperation. Thus, any real assessment of the Barents situation
cannot be fully examined through the lens of the existing cooperation frame-
work. To this degree, there is an entire human experience that exists beyond
the cooperation institutions.
Therefore, while the wellbeing of peoples of the region constitutes the
overriding goal of the Barents cooperation, and collaboration has enabled
better cross-border relations over the years, there is a continuous need to
consolidate cooperation in addressing present and emerging societal challenges.
Against this background, the following chapters intend to assess the
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challenges faced by the Barents population in relation to several human
security issues in order to assess how regional cooperation can address the
populations’ interests and wellbeing.
Conclusion
Since its establishment, the vision of the Barents Region’s cooperation has been
‘to improve peoples’ living conditions, to encourage sustainable social and
economic development, and to have a peaceful and sustainable development in
the northernmost part of Europe’ (BRC 2014, 6). The Kirkenes Declaration
has been the basis for the establishment of a comprehensive framework to
ensure functional cooperation in many ﬁelds, excluding military-security, such
as the environment, economy, human health, tourism and cultural interaction.
Despite occasional tensions between the governments of Russia and the
Nordic countries, the contacts between sub-national governments of, and
regional capitals in, the Barents Region have remained, and contacts between
peoples and civil societies continue to be supported through the institutional
mechanisms that have been created for enhancing cooperation in the region
(e.g., Nilsen 2016a). This precisely accords to the ultimate aim of region-
building with states as major actors – one of the main trends of the post-Cold
War Arctic IR and geopolitics (Artic Council 2004) – i.e. the establishment of
the BEAR as an international, cooperative region located in the former military
theatre of the Cold War. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that from the
point of view of the states, the main objective has been completed, even
though other objectives, such as sustainable development require more eﬀorts
(Heininen 2009).
In eﬀect, the Barents cooperation continues to operate as an institutional
forum to promote dialogue and concrete cooperation with the purpose of
strengthening regional stability, sustainable development and the wellbeing of
the Barents population. The Barents cooperation is truly an achievement,
especially considering the historic context of the Cold War. The borders of
the socialist Soviet Union were closed through much of the 20th century,
and there was very little contact or cooperation across the national borders of
the countries surrounding the Barents Sea, and with the open, democratic
Nordic countries in the West. Such an achievement highlights the deep value
of, and commitment to, mutually beneﬁcial cooperation across borders.
Indeed, for centuries the populations of the Barents Sea area have been closely
intertwined through trade and cultural exchanges, as the Pomor Trade era
well shows. Behind this, the peoples of the region share several features that
were similar, especially for indigenous peoples and settlers, whose families
have lived there for centuries. A problem of the past was that there were few,
if any, opportunities for those living on either side of the border to meet or to
share culture or expertise during most of the 20th century. Despite this, it is
evident that the population has established strong relations under the auspices
of the Barents cooperation.
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As argued, one of the key motives for cooperation between the countries in
the Barents Region was the desire to ensure the wellbeing of the population
across the borders that separate them by consolidating cooperation in key
areas of issues relevant to the region. Despite criticism that the interregional
cooperation is not deep enough, or that the region lacks cultural identity or
ﬁnancial resources, the work of the two Barents Councils shows there is an
ever-growing amount of cooperation among the countries of, and counties in,
the Barents Region. This ranges across diverse sectors such as youth, culture
and human health to tourism and transport, and has strengthened the societal
bonds of the Barents Region’s populations. The sharing of ideas, expertise and
resources has led to improvements in standards of living across the region.
Alongside the exchange of culture and ideas, higher living standards and
increased economic opportunities for all ensures greater levels of economic
and political stability which promotes human security.
Every time a project results in the collaboration between previously oppo-
nent countries, it leads to greater levels of understanding and cooperation.
This form of cooperation is cumulative, and contributes to increased levels of
peace and security within the region. While the Barents cooperation certainly
faces a number of challenges, it remains an important framework to enhance
human security among its civil societies and to strengthen the societal bonds
of its peoples. Indeed, the Barents Region is a society with shared human
security concerns.
Notes
1 For more information about the Barents Region see Olsson et al. (2016), The
Encyclopedia of The Barents Region.
2 www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Facts (visited on 6 October 2016).
3 Declaration of Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, Conference of
Foreign Ministers in Kirkenes, 11 January 1993.
4 www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Facts visited on (6 October 2016).
5 Webpage of the Barents Council: www.barentsinfo.org/Barents-region/Facts (visited
on 7 March 2017).
6 In Norway, nearly 100% of the electricity demand is produced locally with hydro-
power in the counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. Since the beginning of
the 21st century, Sweden is also investing in major wind power development pro-
jects, especially in the counties of Norrbotten and Vasterbotten. While Finland is
also following a similar trend, Russia lags behind in term of investment concerning
renewable energy.
7 For more detailed information about the history of the Barents see Elenius et al.
(2015) and Olsson et al. (2016).
8 At that time, King Magnus Karl Eriksson jointly ruled the territory of Norway
and Sweden but the kingdom remains politically distinct.
9 Webpage of the Nordic Co-operation: www.norden.org/en/fakta-om-norden-1/his
tory-of-the-nordic-region/ﬁve-welfare-states-in-a-global-world-1920 (visited on 7
March 2017).
10 By the time the Soviet Union ended, northwest Russia was the most highly nucle-
arized region in the entire world. The city of Murmansk was home to the Russian
Northern Fleet, which controlled large numbers of nuclear submarines, and there
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were estimated to be at least 270 nuclear installations, both military and civil
situated in the region. There had been very little investment in the region and little
attention paid to quality or to safety during the ﬁnal years of the USSR, which
meant that the nuclear installations posed a huge environmental threat to the
entire region.
11 Declaration Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region Conference of Foreign
Ministers in Kirkenes, 1993.
12 Annex to the Kirkenes Declaration Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic
Region Conference of Foreign Ministers Kirkenes, Norway, 11 January 1993
Terms of Reference for the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, art 1.
13 Administrative Manual for the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 17 June 2008.
14 Administrative Manual for the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 17 June 2008.
15 Webpage of the Barents Council: www.barentscooperation.org/en/Barents-Eur
o-Arctic-Council/Chairmanship (visited on 4 March 2017).
16 Administrative Manual for the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, June 17 2008
17 The Barents Region includes the following counties or their equivalents:
 in Finland: Kainuu, Lapland, Oulu Region and North Karelia.
 in Norway: Finnmark, Nordland and Troms
 in Russia: Arkhangelsk, Karelia, Komi, Murmansk and Nenets.
 in Sweden: Norrbotten and Västerbotten.
18 Barents Regional Council, Barents Regional Committee Terms of Reference
Adopted by the Barents Regional Council on November 14 2012 in Oslo, Norway.
19 Barents Regional Council, Barents Regional Committee Terms of Reference
Adopted by the Barents Regional Council on November 14th 2012 in Oslo,
Norway.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
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